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In 1950s Northern Rhodesia, present day Zambia, rumours abounded amongst the African popula-
tion intimating that the white settlers and administration were extensively involved in witchcraft, 
cannibalism and blood-sucking. In turn, members of the white settler community believed very 
much the same with regard to the African population of the territory. The development of national-
ist politics and the increasing unionization of African workers in colonial Zambia led to agitation 
that was matched with increasing disquiet and fears on the part of white settlers. The emergence 
of ‘Mau Mau’ in Kenya and rumours of ‘Mau Mau’ in Northern Rhodesia served to underscore Eu-
ropean settler fears in Northern Rhodesia. Based on research in the National Archives of Zambia 
and Great Britain, this paper explores the manner in which public rumour played out in Northern 
Rhodesia and gave emphasis to settler fears and fantasies in the territory. 
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  Introduction
In the 1950’s widespread rumours of Mau Mau in central Africa served as a catch-all 
that could be used by both coloniser and colonised, to enthuse and inspire, or frighten 
and threaten. This paper seeks to draw out and trace the emergence of rumours regarding 
Mau Mau in Northern Rhodesia in the 1950s. It seeks to provide a background for these 
rumours by describing the context within which they emerged. As such the paper is divided 
into three sections of which the first describes the changed political setting that emerged 
within the British Empire following World War II. A changed political setting that saw 
the views of Colonial Office bureaucrats increasingly at odds with those of British settlers 
in the Empire. The social scientists employed by the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI) 
in Northern Rhodesia belonged to neither the settler nor the African communities in that 
country. As such they were in a unique position to provide commentary on the wide vari-
ety of contrasting perspectives presented by people in the territory. In particular the RLI 
scientists provided stark evidence on the extensive racism that pervaded society as well as 
the manner in which it was sanctioned by the colonial state. 
The second section of the paper describes the social consequences associated with the 
establishment in 1953 by white settlers of the short lived Central African Federation (CAF), 
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Nyasaland (Malawi). The paper describes and discusses how the CAF was established 
in blatant opposition to the African inhabitants of the territories concerned. As the CAF 
came to be established the most incredible and fantastic of rumours came to circulate 
through the territory of Northern Rhodesia. However, far more than being merely idle 
and innocuous gossip without any real impact on the day to day lives in Northern Rho-
desia, the rumours had a serious and sustained impact on the people’s behaviour. Even 
though the colonial state sought by all manner of means to disprove the rumours, this in-
volvement merely served to increase the validity of the claims being made in the rumours. 
The widespread opposition to the CAF which, it is argued, was manifest in the spread of 
rumours that claimed that all Africans were to be eliminated by being fed poisoned food-
stuffs, came to be channelled in the early 1950s into overt political opposition to the CAF 
in the form of the African National Congress.
In the final section of the paper events elsewhere in the British Empire are linked 
to socio-political developments in Northern Rhodesia. In the British colony of Kenya a 
series of disturbances coupled with armed unrest developed into a broadly supported 
insurrection against settler rule which came to be known as Mau Mau. Within Northern 
Rhodesia news of events in Kenya triggered all manner of reactions ranging from disgust 
and rejection, to support and inspiration. The paper shows how events elsewhere in the 
British Empire, and Kenya in particular, came to encourage and enthuse Africans liv-
ing in Northern Rhodesia. The central concern of this piece in dealing with rumours of 
Mau Mau in Northern Rhodesia, is not so much the objective validity of the rumours, but 
rather their intended and unintended effects.
  Changed Imperial Policy
The landslide election victory in 1945 of the British Labour Party led by Clement 
Attlee brought about radical change in Britain, and initiated long-term and irreversible 
changes in Northern Rhodesia and the British Empire as a whole. Desperate for capital 
to fund its war time debts and the emerging welfare state, the British government be-
gan the process of divesting itself of those parts of the empire that it could no longer 
afford to hold, whilst seeking to encourage economic development in those parts of 
the empire that held promise. Little more than two years after taking office, the La-
bour government oversaw the partition and independence of ‘the jewel in the crown’, 
India. At the same time the newly established Colonial Development Corporation and 
Overseas Food Corporation envisaged economic promise in proposals that included, 
amongst others, the establishment of enormous groundnut schemes in Tanganyika 
and the possible settlement of white settler farmers on the Nyika plateau in Nyasaland.1 
Further afield the tin mines and rubber plantations of Malaya were considered to be 
of vital importance to Britain’s post-war economic reconstruction. In the interests of 
economic efficiency that would benefit Britain, it was envisaged that federations be 
established within the Empire in the West Indies, the Far East, East Africa, and the 
1  The “Groundnut Affair”, has come down to us in history as one of the most striking examples of failure in de-
velopment schemes (Wood 1950). afrika focus — 2009-06 [ 39 ]
Rumours of Mau Mau in Northern Rhodesia, 1950 – 1960
Rhodesias. A Colonial Office mandarin informed the United Nations in 1947:
“The fundamental objectives in Africa are to foster the emergence of large-scale societies, integrated 
for self-government by effective and democratic political and economic institutions both national 
and local, inspired by a common faith in progress and Western values and equipped with efficient 
techniques of production and betterment.” (A.H. Poyton in Ferguson 2003: 357-8).
Though many may not have believed it at the time, the granting of Indian independ-
ence signalled to colonial subjects the inevitable dissolution of the British Empire and 
the ending of colonial rule. The independence and partition of India held within it the 
promise of independence for all colonial territories in the Empire. Henceforth the pos-
sible existence of independent African territories ceased to be a pipe-dream entertained 
by fantasists and dreamers. Although it would take another twelve years before Harold 
Macmillan would deliver his ‘Winds of Change’ speech to an unbelieving settler audience 
in Pretoria, the eventual independence of African territories under majority rule had been 
decided upon by Whitehall mandarins in 1948.
In February 1948 a number of ex-servicemen who had served the Empire in Burma 
were shot and killed by police in Accra as they sought to make their protests known to the 
British governor of the Gold Coast. In the aftermath of the killings and the disturbances 
that followed, the British government appointed a commission, “to enquire into and re-
port on the recent disturbances … and their underlying causes”.2 Commenting on the 
political causes that had led to the violent confrontation, the commission noted a failure 
on the part of the government to recognise that, “the spread of liberal ideas, increasing 
literacy … closer contact with political developments in other parts of the world, [and] … 
[t]he achievement of self-government in India, Burma and Ceylon had not passed unno-
ticed in the Gold Coast”.3 The Commission recommended that various political amend-
ments, “be adopted for a period of ten years”.4 Although the British government in its 
official reaction emphasised “that it is not possible to lay down in advance the pace of 
political development”, and sought to retain a hold on the course of change, within ten 
years of the report having been written the Gold Coast had gained its full political inde-
pendence as Ghana.5 In the same way that India, Burma and Ceylon had inspired Gha-
naian independence, so too events in the Gold Coast and the rest of the world inspired 
those seeking majority rule elsewhere in Africa. 
Classically schooled civil servants may have recognised the inevitable decline and 
fall of the British Empire, yet it was another matter altogether for many of the British 
2  Colonial Office, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast 1948, London 1948, 
p. 4. The report is commonly referred to as the Watson Report.  See also National Archives, Kew, Colonial Office, 
CO 96/795/6, Strikes and Disturbances: Riots after Parade of Ex-Servicemen in Accra.
3  Watson Report, pp. 7-8.
4  Colonial Office, Statement by His Majesty’s Government on the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Dis-
turbances in the Gold Coast 1948, London 1948, p. 9.
5  Statement by HMG on Watson Report, p. 9.afrika focus — Volume 22, Nr. 1 [ 40 ]
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settlers who had sought to establish themselves with hopes for a prosperous future in 
the empire’s far-flung territories. In addition, as the world staggered into the ‘Cold War’ 
geo-political issues and military interests came into conflict with African nationalism, 
and fuelled and inflamed settler myths and fantasies.
  The Colonial Setting
“Union policy reacts on Central African policy – many of the Europeans in Central Africa are 
South African by birth and sympathy – and the entrenchment of a caste system in the Union 
fortifies racialism in Central Africa, tending to prevent any increase in racial inclusiveness there 
also.” (Wilson & Wilson 1945: 156).
Anthropologists of the Rhodes Livingstone Institute commented upon the racism 
that they encountered when they started working in Zambia in the 1940s. This came most 
explicitly to the fore in the mining towns where the concentration of large numbers of 
white settlers allowed for the open expression of racism in everyday life. To put it bluntly, 
colonial officials, many of whom were stationed at some distance from large settler com-
munities, could ill afford to let their racism dominate their daily lives. Many of these men, 
particularly prior to World War II, were Oxbridge graduates who, by dint of their educa-
tion and background were not necessarily dependent upon the colour of their skin for 
job security. District commissioners, if they wished to continue to govern and administer 
effectively, could not allow their racial prejudices to gain the upper hand in their day-to-
day dealings with the Northern Rhodesian population. This is not to deny that a number 
of these officials were strongly prejudiced or that many of their activities could not be 
deemed to be extremely patronising and paternalistic. The circumstances, which deter-
mined a modicum of consideration on the part of colonial administrators, appeared not 
to apply to the white immigrants who worked in the mines in Northern Rhodesia, many 
of whom came from South Africa. 
By 1940 the colonial state was firmly established in Zambia, and the cities and mines 
were increasingly being filled with settlers who soon soaked up and shared the senti-
ments of white South Africa. Stark anecdotal information provided by Peter Fraenkel 
sheds light on these views.6 Fraenkel describes how, whilst driving to the European quar-
ter of Ndola, the bus made a short stop to drop off Fraenkel’s African colleague. This 
resulted in a discussion in the bus led by a young white Rhodesian and a “red-faced and 
pimply” young man with an English north-country accent:
“‘What’s this building?’ asked the young Rhodesian.
‘African hotel, just newly built,’ said the elderly European. He seemed to have an Italian accent.
‘What!!!’ The young man was aghast; ‘we go to the compound to drop a kaffir first?’
‘Hotel á la Bantu,’ sniggered the north-country youth.
…
6   Fraenkel was closely associated with the Rhodes Livingstone anthropologists, even to the extent of later marry-
ing one of them, Ms. Merran McCulloch. (see: Fraenkel 1964; Fraenkel 2005; MacCulloch 1951).afrika focus — 2009-06 [ 41 ]
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‘Well, I don’t know what this country is coming to …’ grumbled the Rhodesian.
‘I’m a Rhodesian, born and bred in Umtali,’ he continued, ‘and I think it’s all wrong.
It’s those fellows in England …’
The young Englishman hastened to ingratiate himself: ‘Yeah, they don’t know what things are 
like here. I came out to Southern Rhodesia three years ago and I can tell you, when I first got out 
I also thought “Treat them like human beings” but now … well, now I know them. Baboons, 
straight off the trees. Do you think this could have happened in the South?’”.
(Fraenkel 1959: 74-75; see also: Fraenkel 2005: 184-5).
Max Gluckman, anthropologist and director of the RLI, had emphasised time and 
again that the inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia, white immigrants as well as Africans, 
were all members of a single social unit. Yet the only RLI researcher to actually seriously 
study aspects of the white community of Northern Rhodesia was Hans Holleman. He 
undertook commissioned research at the request of the Northern Rhodesian Chamber 
of Mines on the “attitudes of white mining employees towards life and work on the Cop-
perbelt and at Broken Hill”. Holleman’s research, which was finally published after he 
moved to the Netherlands, makes for interesting and, at times, humorous reading. The 
opening words of his study display a dry and appealing sense of humour:
“One of the intriguing aspects of the swift turn of African history in the late ‘fifties and early ‘six-
ties has been the inability of the white communities fully to comprehend the speed and magnitude 
of impending political change. Nowhere, perhaps, was this more evident than in the mining 
centres of Northern Rhodesia – now Zambia – where the expatriate white minorities, living in 
closed communities in the vastness of underdeveloped Africa, proudly (if sometimes recklessly) 
pursued what they believed to be the distinctive and superior values of the ‘European way of life’. 
Sustained by a protective employment structure and a general affluence probably unequalled in 
any other white community in Africa, they succeeded in creating for themselves exclusive spheres 
of social refuge (and of mental escape) from the African world around them.”
(Holleman & Biesheuvel 1973: vii).
Protected by racist legislation, communities of people were able to establish lives 
for themselves in the mining towns of Northern Rhodesia that would have been virtu-
ally impossible elsewhere. What is particularly disturbing about the Northern Rhodesian 
situation is that so many of these people believed that this was their natural right. Holle-
man described the life and noted:
“As the industry prospered and the mining communities grew more and more affluent, the pursuit 
of wealth and comfort soon became the established dogma of a prevalent and highly materialistic 
faith. [...]
This very largely immigrant community came from many countries, overseas and in the south, 
[62% of all male employees came from South Africa] where most of these values were to a greater 
or less extent the privilege of the upper strata of society. The vast majority of mining employees afrika focus — Volume 22, Nr. 1 [ 42 ]
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did not derive from these strata, but were working-class people to whom the acquisition of these 
values was tangible evidence of having made good in the new society. Naturally their ambitions 
were directed toward achieving these aims. In the Copperbelt employment structure even semi-
skilled men could earn as much as, and sometimes more than, academically trained persons.” 
(Holleman & Biesheuvel 1973: 35).
 
Holleman’s work describes a situation in which boorish and racist behaviour in the 
workplace and the social setting were sanctioned and appeared to be rewarded by the ad-
ministration. That this behaviour extended to the very pinnacle of settler society is made 
abundantly clear by the exasperation expressed by the British colonial official Greenall 
who whilst serving as District Commissioner in Broken Hill noted the ridiculous nature 
of colonial rule:
Some of them [master and servants litigation] were outlandish in the extreme, such as the oc-
casion when Mrs Welensky [wife of the future prime minister of the Central African Federation] 
filed a formal complaint with the police that one of her ‘houseboys’ had stolen a slice of Christmas 
cake. (Coe & Greenall 2003: 96-7).
It cannot be considered surprising that in these circumstances the work and con-
duct of those who rejected the racist stereotypes of settler society were considered to be 
suspect.
The activities of Arnold Leonard (Bill) Epstein as a young anthropologist in North-
ern Rhodesia provide us with insight into the relations -such as they existed- between 
the RLI researchers and the colonial milieu at the time. Epstein, who by this stage had 
completed a law degree, served in World War II, and travelled from his native Ireland to 
Sri Lanka, modestly described his arrival in Zambia in 1950 in the following manner:
I was at the time a rather naïve young man with no experience, and certainly little appreciation, 
of the nature of a colonial settler society, and I had conceived of my study as a purely academic 
exercise – what I hoped would prove to be a contribution to the anthropology of law. I was very 
quickly disabused of this idea. (Epstein 1992: 2).
For although Epstein believed he was no threat, to many living in Northern Rhode-
sia at the time he did indeed pose a threat, particularly to those who owed their positions 
and careers to racial prejudice. 
In later years when reflecting on conditions in Northern Rhodesia in the early 1950s, 
Epstein noted that the atmosphere of the time was “quite nightmarish” (Yelvington 1997: 
293). As the nationalist movement developed in Zambia in opposition to plans for a 
Central African Federation dominated by white settlers in Southern Rhodesia, politics 
in Northern Rhodesia became ever more heated. The cold war and the spectre of com-
munist fifth columnists did little to calm the situation. The enforced establishment of the 
Federation in direct opposition to the wishes of the majority of the African population afrika focus — 2009-06 [ 43 ]
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led to a very volatile situation in Zambia. Indeed, as the nationalist movement gained in 
strength, opposition between “whites and blacks” became more the norm, and those, 
such as the RLI researchers, who chose to oppose and not participate in these charades 
in which stereotypes as opposed to people dominated, were further alienated from settler 
society. As Epstein noted, “if ever there was a situation that was made for paranoia, that 
was it” (idem).
  Poisoned Sugar, tinned Human meat, and Vampires
“But to me all this was no laughing matter. I knew that the Mau Mau in Kenya had been 
launched with [a] ‘ridiculous’ rumour…”. (Fraenkel 1959: 199).
The establishment of a federation in Central Africa comprising Southern Rhodesia, 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was central to the maintenance of white settler rule 
in Central Africa, and in keeping with ideas formulated by the colonial office in the im-
mediate aftermath of the war in 1945. Although the idea of federation was enthusiasti-
cally supported by European settlers in Southern Rhodesia, the same did not hold true 
for the African populations of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In Southern Province 
in late 1951, District Commissioner J. E. Passmore noted in his monthly ‘public opinion 
report’:
“The general attitude of Africans is one of intense suspiscion [sic] that the Europeans are plotting 
to take away their land. Every political move or development proposal is viewed in this light. The 
political [sic] minded have easily been able to take advantage of and increase this feeling to whip 
up opposition to Amalgamation and Federation […]. The educated Africans without exception re-
gard partnership as a plot to work the African into a position where he cannot oppose federation. 
They will have no difficulty whatever in bringing the village Africans round to this view. […]. 
Mr. Harry Nkumbula is the leader of the opposition to political developments proposed; he found 
the fear of loss of land ready-made for him to work on; he has done so very successfully in spite of 
a very large measure of personal unpopularity particularly amongst the educated Africans.”7
The American anthropologist Hortense Powdermaker arrived in Zambia, Northern 
Rhodesia, in September 1953, shortly after the formal inauguration of the Central African 
Federation.8 Powdermaker noted that the Federation had come to be established despite 
widespread opposition manifest in “speeches, motions and protests”, and that:
“When I began my field work, the meaning of the new political union became quickly apparent 
to me because the fear of federation and the loss of land was dragged into almost every interview 
and conversation, regardless of context or relevancy.” (Powdermaker 1962: 63).
7  National Archives of Zambia, (NAZ), SP 1/3/3, ‘District and Provincial Intelligence Reports’, 1947-55. J.E. Pass-
more (DC, Namwala), ‘Monthly Report: Public Opinion’ Namwala, 4 Dec. 1951 (‘Secret’), NAZ, SP 1/3/3. With 
thanks to Giacomo Macola for generous access to his archival notes. 
8  For a partisan view of the Federation see Welensky (1964).afrika focus — Volume 22, Nr. 1 [ 44 ]
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Although she never specifically interviewed on the subject of federation, “most Af-
ricans, with or without education, young and old, appeared to have a compulsive need to 
talk about it and the related fear of losing their land” (idem). What struck Powdermaker 
forcefully was the repeated reference by African informants to the loss of land and the 
ultimate fate of the North American Indian populations (ibid.: 64).
African fears regarding the loss of land and domination by white settlers, were not 
unfounded. In a visit to Lusaka in 1949, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
Arthur Creech-Jones, stated not unreasonably that “Permanent white settlement needs to 
be controlled. Because Northern Rhodesia is a Protectorate, the Africans have been guar-
anteed certain inherent rights and therefore in agricultural development there are certain 
definite restrictions so far as Europeans are concerned”; hardly controversial it would 
seem, but in the context of settler society in Central Africa at the time the statement by 
Creech-Jones had explosive consequences (Welensky 1964: 33-4). On the following day 
Welensky, the settler prime minister of Northern Rhodesia, thundered that should the 
British Government wish to implement its wishes:
“It will have to bring troops to this country to carry it out. The European community will not 
under any circumstances recognise a paramountcy of African interests. I am prepared to work in 
partnership with the African people – and for as long as I can see, in that partnership we will 
be the senior partners – but I will never accept that Northern Rhodesia is to be an African state.” 
(Welensky 1964: 34, empasis added).
Sir Godfrey Huggins (later Viscount Malvern), the prime minister of Southern Rho-
desia, summed up white settler ideals when he commented, “Yes, it will be a partnership 
– such as exists between a horse and its rider” (Coe & Greenall 2003: 100). Welensky’s 
clear statement of intent coupled with numerous and equally jarring comments, “If the 
Africans don’t come in with the Europeans, they will face the fate of the Red Indians in 
North America”, served to ensure that the African inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia were 
at all times opposed to the establishment of the federation (Welensky 1964: 57). However 
the manner in which this opposition came to be expressed, did not necessarily dovetail 
neatly into European settler or Colonial Official perceptions of what constituted opposi-
tion to the envisaged federation.
Peter Fraenkel, the young broadcaster and close friend of the Rhodes Livingstone 
anthropologists, described how he stumbled upon Africans engaged in the clandestine 
printing of anti-federation pamphlets. However, in contrast to the strident rhetoric com-
monly associated with political pamphlets, the flyers being illegally stencilled on a Roneo 
machine in the offices of the Northern Rhodesia Broadcasting Services, entitled, “Private 
Circular to Africans only!”, noted, in the summarised words of Fraenkel:
“That on the 28th October the ‘House of Laws’ in London had decided to put poisoned sugar on sale 
to Africans, commencing on February 8th of next year, 1953. This would have the effect in the case 
of women, of causing their children to be born dead, and with men of making them impotent. afrika focus — 2009-06 [ 45 ]
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The sugar would be recognised by the letters LPS on the packets. All Africans were warned to 
beware of such sugar”. (Fraenkel 1959: 197).
In seeking to understand the background to the circular, Fraenkel spoke to Africans 
whom “I had known since I was a child”, and in discussing the rumour:
“Time and again they brought up the name of Welensky. Didn’t I know that he had said he 
would kill all natives? Didn’t I know that the same had been done in America?” (ibid.: 199).
At a public meeting held by the African National Congress in Lusaka in early 1954, 
speakers following up on Welensky’s comments stated “that the African population 
would be wiped out like the Red Indians and aborigines of Australia if they did not take 
action”. In addition speakers expressed their belief that “Europeans doctored African 
beer to induce sterility among Africans”.9 
In 2000 Luise White, following up and developing on the earlier works of Musam-
bachime and Brelsford, published an interesting and wide-ranging study of African be-
liefs regarding occult beings in central and east Africa. Referring to the formidable and 
distinguished American anthropologist, Hortense Powdermaker, White (2000) noted 
that:
“She reported the stories without reference to the dates involved or the writing on the packets, 
and she interpreted them in terms of witchcraft poisonings. For the anthropologist, this was not 
a rumor, but what happened when ‘the rational fear of Federation moved into the realm of the 
supernatural’.”
For its part the colonial administration of Northern Rhodesia had its own take on 
the ‘poisoned sugar’. In the monthly ‘public opinion reports’ (which in the run-up to fed-
eration as of June 1953 became ‘intelligence reports’) colonial administrators discussed 
the rumours and sought to develop a more sinister approach to the rumour. In a report 
drafted in early 1953 it was noted that the District Officer in charge of Kalomo had come 
upon a letter written by Harry Nkumbula that dealt with “Mr. Welensky’s ‘Red Indian’ 
speech”,“ ‘vampire men’, and the disappearance of Africans”.10 Gervase Clay, acting pro-
vincial commissioner for Southern Province, wrote:
“The origin of the ‘poison sugar’ rumour cannot be in doubt. There is strong suspicion that a 
quantity of drugs capable of causing abortions which was stolen from Kasenga Mission earlier 
in 1952, came into Nkumbula’s possession. If Nkumbula is in possession of these drugs he may 
have succeeded in causing a number of abortions. The occurrence of these abortions would give a 
9  NA, DO 35/4778, Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Report, February 1954, paragraph 10. Hereafter this 
report is referred to as “NRPIR” followed by the month, year and paragraph or section number.
10  NAZ, SP 1/3/3, G. Clay (Acting PC, SP), ‘Monthly Report on Public Opinion December 1952’, L’stone, 20 Jan. 
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colour of truth to the rumour which is now being circulated. The District Officer in charge Kalomo 
believes that Nkumbula has considerable interest (or influence) in an African tearoom in Lusaka. 
Again, if Nkumbula still has these drugs the District Officer in charge considers it not impossible 
that Government may be faced with a staged ‘discovery’ of sugar which has been poisoned in 
some store or other place. The effects of such a ‘discovery’ can be imagined.”11
In September 1952 K.M. Chittenden, the District Commissioner for Namwala, Harry 
Nkumbula’s home district, had written to the Provincial Commissioner Southern Prova 
ince and suggested:
“I cannot help thinking that a little publicity carefully put around about his private life might be 
advantageous although I appreciate the difficulties in so doing.”12
In the event, the person suspected of having misappropriated the drugs and who 
was as a result dismissed from her position, was Nkumbula’s mistress. Although the 
colonial authorities sought to blame Nkumbula, by insinuating that his mistress through 
carrying out abortions, had somehow initiated the poisoned sugar rumours, the mission-
ary in charge of Kasenga dispensary, wryly commented that:
“Ergot is a black liquid of distinct odour and filthy taste. Its uses in poisoned sugar therefore 
might be rather limited.”13
The exasperation on the part of colonial administrators in attempting to rationally 
deal with rumours and gossip that threatened and essentially ridiculed their administra-
tion is illustrated by the frustration expressed by Roy Welensky in his bitter overview of 
the federation:
“The fear-laden stories grew wilder as the months went by: I had ordered the Africans’ sugar to be 
poisoned, so that African women might miscarry and African men become impotent; tins of meat 
contained human flesh, poisoned to break African opposition to federation.”
(Welensky 1964: 55).
In a desperate attempt to break these rumours a district commissioner and his 
trusted African assistants consumed contaminated tins in public, only to have the whole 
exercise backfire spectacularly. Instead of disproving the rumour, the public display of 
the District Commissioner and his assistants only served to emphasise the power of their 
magic (Welensky 1964: 55; Esptein 1992: 174-5).
11  NAZ, SP 1/3/3, G. Clay (Acting PC, SP), ‘Monthly Report on Public Opinion December 1952’, L’stone, 20 Jan. 
1953.
12  K.M. Chittenden to PC (SP), [Namwala], 2 Sept. 1952.
13  NAZ, SP 1/3/3, K.M. Chittenden (DC, Namwala), ‘Public Opinion Report: Namwala  District, February 1953’, 
Namwala, 26 Feb. 1953 (‘Secret’), NAZ, SP 1/3/3.afrika focus — 2009-06 [ 47 ]
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Particularly frustrating for the British Colonial administration were the persistent 
reports of ‘vampire men’ or Banyama (people of meat i.e. cannibals), rumours whose 
fantastic nature meant that they were impossible to deal with rationally. Central Africans 
believed that their society was being terrorised by occult beings who slaughtered inno-
cent humans for their flesh, body parts, fats and fluids. To the exasperation of colonial 
officials, Africans accused the colonial government of complicity in that it either actively 
abetted or at the very least did nothing to protect people from these attacks. The fact that 
in living memory murders for ritual purposes or that acts of cannibalism had occurred 
and had been admitted to under oath in the colonial courts of law only served to under-
score the fear of Africans and belie the protestations of the colonial administration.14 In 
the absence of colonial government protection against witchcraft, a concept which in 
the mindset of the colonial administration did not exist other than that it was an expres-
sion of primitive superstition, murder in retaliation for acts of witchcraft were common 
throughout the period of colonial rule. Max Marwick, who conducted research into sor-
cery in its social setting in Northern Rhodesia in the 1950’s noted:
“Most informants among the Cewa are aware of the fact that whites disapprove of beliefs in sor-
cery. They tend, therefore, not to relate incidents implying such beliefs unless they are sure that 
their listener will take them seriously, will not try to eradicate them, and will be generally sym-
pathetic. … I might add that, even with ideal rapport, informants usually become reticent when 
they remember, not only that it is a criminal offence to impute witchcraft (including sorcery) to 
others, but also that, by doing so, they may arouse the hostility and precipitate the vengeance of 
those to whom they impute it.” (Marwick 1965: 18).15
The witchcraft ordinances of the colonial administration forbade any accusation of 
witchcraft by any authority, which, as Hugo Hinfelaar noted, “in reality left the people 
without any legal sanctions and without any recourse in their fear” (Hinfelaar 1994: 143). 
In the absence of government protection and in the presence of such a blatant threat 
people sought to take the law into their own hands:
“In Mufulira the finding in the early hours of the 23rd of November of a heap of abandoned clothing near 
a deep pit created a “banyama”(vampire) scare and stones were thrown at two caravans parked nearby 
and occupied by Europeans. In the afternoon a large crowd of Africans gathered near the caravans 
and stoned a police party called out to restore order.” (NRPIR December 1953, §3).
14  On earlier references to Banyama and colonial complicity see: Gann (1969: 231-2).
  National Archives, Kew, CO 795/77/3The Natives Affairs Report for 1934 p. 33 reports that in the Kalabo 
district:
  “three old hags … dug up a human corpse and ate portions of it. They were convicted of desecrating a grave, 
cannibalism not constituting a criminal offence under the laws of NR.”
15  In addition Marwick referred to the Northern Rhodesia, Witchcraft Ordinance, No. 5 of 1914 as amended by No. 
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As Musambachime, Brelsford and White have noted in their respective studies, 
Game rangers and Tse tse fly guards were seen by the populace as being complicit in 
Banyama. As such the intelligence reports for the 1950s make extensive references to 
game guards, who were wont to stroll through the bush, being obstructed in their work, 
attacked and accused of witchcraft (NRPIR December 1953, §14).
In western Zambia people developed kaliloze guns, magical guns fashioned from hu-
man tibia that were used to execute witches.16 In 1956 there was a spate of murders in 
which “the victims had been shot at fairly close range with short-barrelled homemade 
muzzle-loaders, commonly known as Kaliloze night guns” (Reynolds 1963: 11). In the 
event, in little more than a year thousands of people were arrested and interrogated 
and 1,212 cases dealt with by district officers in Kalabo, Mongu, Senanga and Sesheke 
(ibid.: 139). Following confessions “by murderers and information subsequently ob-
tained” people were arrested and found to be in “possession not only [of] kaliloze guns 
but also human skulls, limb bones and, in a few cases, reputedly human flesh” (ibid.: 11). 
In addition a number of people were taken into protective custody after having been ac-
cused of, and in some cases having admitted to, cannibalism (ibid.: 24-7).
  British Government ideas regarding the Central African Federation
Following the formal establishment of the Central African Federation in August 1953, 
Northern Rhodesia Political Intelligence Reports were submitted monthly to the Dominions 
Office in London. These reports, and in particular the comments written in the margins by 
Whitehall mandarins, make for extremely interesting reading, particularly as they were not 
intended for public consumption, and as such opinions were voiced and expressed which 
would normally have been unheard of. A four page brief drafted by W.S. Bates for the 
Minister in October 1955 illustrates this point very clearly. Referring to the Intelligence Re-
port for September 1955 Bates noted:
“In general, I must confess that for me this whole report makes depressing reading. Here in a 
survey covering only a month we have reports of:-
a)  An African National Congress campaign against law and order…
b)  A further series of stone throwing incidents…
c)  A concerted attempt to drive European traders from the Copperbelt
  fish markets;…
d)  Mr. Van Eeden’s17 overwhelming victory at Kafue…
e)  Various threats of violence against Europeans.”18
Bates was hardly the type to be alarmist or to exaggerate a situation. He noted, “it 
16  Many would allege that the execution of witches by Kaliloze guns continues in contemporary Zambia. A manu-
script on the topic is currently being prepared by the author, for previously published material see, Barrie Rey-
nolds (1963: 79-88).
17  Van Eeden was a politician who sought a closer alliance with apartheid South Africa.
18  NA, DO 35/4778, comments drafted by W.S. Bates 28 October 1955.afrika focus — 2009-06 [ 49 ]
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is true that that these security reports inevitably underline the black spots and tend to 
ignore the patches of light”, nevertheless, after “reading them month after month, it is 
impossible to avoid the impression that race relations in Northern Rhodesia … seem to 
be getting steadily worse instead of better”.19 Indeed, whilst white settlers in the federation 
continued to fool themselves with the idea that the federation would hold, Bates noted that 
unless the federal government went out of its way “to win over the African population” the 
federation would collapse. In addition, for those supporting federation, Bates noted:
Nor is it any use their deluding themselves that time is on their side. It is true that within the next 
generation Kariba and the industrial development flowing from it will bring within the reach of 
many thousands of African a standard of living at present beyond their dreams, and that these 
benefits will be the direct result of Federation. But the tide of African nationalism cannot be held 
in check while these new forces are harnessed. The emergence of the Gold Coast and of part at least 
of Nigeria to full self-government, […] will provide a fresh impulse.20
Bates warned that unless things changed the coming years would “see an enormous 
expansion” in “Congress parties” and that “the whole tenor of their policy and propa-
ganda [would] be anti-European and anti-Federation”.21
  Mau Mau Settler Fear
“Sir Godfrey [Huggins] is, I know, concerned that suitable action is taken for he realises the 
potential danger of these African Nationalist movements. One need only look 500/600 miles 
North of the Federation’s Northern borders to see what can happen. It is now spreading to other 
tribes.”22
In the course of 1951 discriminatory legislation, self-fulfilling fears, the hubris of 
elders and authorities, coupled to widespread dissatisfaction and bruised youthful pride 
and aspirations all combined to initiate a series of ever more violent incidents that eventu-
ally snowballed into an historical sequence of events that has become known to us as Mau 
Mau. It is a term that has come to carry a broad range of morally laden historical mean-
ings; for many it is a movement of incipient revolutionary warfare, for others a striking 
example of primitive African brutality. Whatever the current historical understanding of 
Mau Mau, it was, for settler society of the 1950s, the epitome of colonial society gone 
wrong; the opposite of the world as it should be.23 Mau Mau was the shadow under the 
bed, the dark forces that came out at night and fulfilled the wildest fears, dreams and 
19  NA, DO 35/4778, comments drafted by W.S. Bates 28 October 1955.
20  NA, DO 35/4778, comments drafted by W.S. Bates 28 October 1955. Emphasis added by JBG.
21  NA, DO 35/4778, comments drafted by W.S. Bates 28 October 1955.
22  NA, DO 35/4778, Security Liaison Office, Salisbury to Ian Maclennan, Salisbury, 15 June 1954.
23  There is a welter of publications that relate to Mau Mau, its origins, its existence, and its effects. A good intro-
duction to the swathe of literature would include the following: (Edgerton 1989; Lonsdale 1992; Cooper 1988; 
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fantasies of settler society.24 As the brutalities and atrocities meted out by combatants in 
Kenya came to inspire and disgust both colonized and colonizer, Mau Mau came to be an 
effective and shared shorthand for discussing and debating the morality and validity of 
colonial rule in late colonial southern and central Africa.
For many Northern Rhodesian Africans Mau Mau was an exhilarating slogan, a con-
cept and a constantly morphing mental image that clearly troubled the colonial authori-
ties and settlers in particular. The unexpected power that lay behind the invocation of 
a conflict that lay more than a thousand kilometres away in Kenya (and at times eight 
thousand kilometres away in Malaya) inspired Zambian nationalists and greatly troubled 
those tasked with administering Northern Rhodesia. Events in Malaya and Kenya, where 
Northern Rhodesian troops had been deployed in active combat, served to inspire Afri-
cans in Northern Rhodesia.
In early 1954 a young man living in Ndola who bore the nom de guerre Morris Ma-
laya “mentioned privately that he would like to form a communist party branch” and that 
he “wanted Communism because it provided a better government for people who were 
poor like Africans” (NRPIR April 1954, §3). At the same time intelligence reports noted 
that “at various … Congress meetings at Lusaka there have been threats against the po-
lice and wild talk about attacking them” (NRPIR, February 1954, §10). These calls were 
not limited to the rank and file of the African National Congress, there were increasingly 
militant calls emanating from within leading positions of  Congress. Thus in early 1954, 
police informers reported to the colonial authorities that Wellington (sometimes known 
as Whittington) Kakoma Sikalumbi (Chief Clerk at Congress head office) had “said that 
the time was close at hand for action and fighting” (NRPIR, February 1954, §10). A month 
later Sikalumbi re-appeared in the monthly intelligence report in which it was noted that:
“Wellington […] Kakoma Sikalumbi Congress Chief Clerk, […] said at a meeting that in future 
all congress ”Police” should wear a uniform of black trousers, white shirt and black bow tie, with 
a red and black armband, towards the cost of which they should each contribute $1. He claimed 
that the Action Group – the ‘police’ – now number 200 and he forecast that it would take a 
strong line in the future, but he did not say what this line would be. There is evidence that these 
‘Police’ have been in action. At the executive meeting of Congress held at Lusaka on the 20/21st 
of March they checked on all persons to ensure that no members of the Northern Rhodesia Police 
were present.” (NRPIR, March 1954, §12).
In July of 1954, as the Central African Federation increasingly became enmeshed in daily 
life, the hitherto peaceful protests of Nkumbula’s African National Congress in the absence of 
success appeared to run out of steam. Instead there were increasing calls for militant action, 
thus it was reported that:
24  In one instance the idea of Mau Mau inspired a young colonial official in Tanzania to undertake two tours 
through his district that owed nothing to actual verifiable Mau Mau activities in his district, but all the more to 
a misguided romantic reasoning that could have been drawn from a close and intensive reading of Boys Own. 
John Cooke, Memoirs of a Reformed Imperialist Africa Since 1951 to the Present Day Manuscript in author’s 
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“Speeches and letters by those Africans who remain in the left wing of the Congress make increas-
ing references to Mau Mau. Another indication of the militant views of this group is one reported 
instance of the training of uniformed women members of the movement.”
(NRPIR, July 1954, §2).
More specifically, intelligence reports noted that ANC committee members had 
stated that if “Africans did not get self Government, plans which might lead to blood-
shed had been prepared by Congress in both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and 
these would force the issue” (NRPIR, July 1954, §17). It was reported that at a meeting 
held in Lusaka in July 1954 Congress official Simon Tembe Yobi had claimed:
“That plans had been made to safeguard Africans against ill treatment by Europeans and these 
might mean that Mau Mau might come to Northern Rhodesia.”
(NRPIR, July 1954, §18).
In addition it was reported that Rambhai Devabhai Patel, President of the British 
Indian Association, had “advised one of the Nyasaland African Members of Parliament to 
tell his people to give up their lives for their country as the Mau Mau were doing in Kenya” 
(NRPIR, July 1954, §18). 
British colonial officials were worried by the, “increasing frequency of reports 
mentioning threats of violence and references to Mau Mau activities in the utterances 
of the hot-headed and the young” (NRPIR August 1954, §12). In particular comments 
that the “African people should be prepared to sell their lives as the Mau Mau are do-
ing in Kenya” (NRPIR August 1954, §184). As time went by the calls for militant action 
coupled to disquieting activities that included the wearing of uniforms and military 
drilling did not diminish. That these new policies were part and parcel of Congress is 
indicated by the overt presence of all at the conference of the Northern Rhodesia African 
National Congress which was held in Lusaka from 17-20 August 1954. The conference was 
policed by “Congress ‘police’ guards”:
“These guards were […] dressed in a uniform consisting of a khaki bush shirt with a red and black 
congress badge on the left breast and home-made epaulettes on each shoulder, a red fez, khaki 
shorts and stockings, and black shoes.” (NRPIR August 1954, Appendix A).
Intelligence reports indicate that Harry Nkumbula, president of the African National 
Congress, was well aware of the parallels that existed between Congress militants and Mau 
Mau. Nkumbula allegedly stated “that the Northern Rhodesia Government had interpreted 
agitation by Congress against Federation as a threat of terrorism similar to Mau Mau and 
had made complete plans to meet any terrorist action”(NRPIR August 1954, Appendix A).afrika focus — Volume 22, Nr. 1 [ 52 ]
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In spite of the threat of government action as intimated by Nkumbula, the conference 
delegates did not mince their words. At the close of the conference party organiser Nephas 
Tembo called for direct action and that “threats should be made to induce the government 
to comply with the wishes of Congress” (NRPIR August 1954, Appendix A). This call for 
action, in the context of the conference, was opposed by Harry Nkumbula. However, later 
in a private meeting at the house of Rev. Dr. S.J. Tladi, of the African Methodist Episcopal 
Church, Nkumbula, clearly unaware that his words were being be recorded and reported 
by informers of the Northern Rhodesian police, “warned those present against talking 
about killing”. However, in this instance, Nkumbula noted, in the words of the intel-
ligence report, “that their friends in Kenya had made their plans long before fighting 
started without the Government being aware of them, which was why they were still able 
to continue fighting” (NRPIR August 1954, Appendix A, p.3, §8). Spoken as they were in 
the context of Mau Mau and what might come to pass in Northern Rhodesia, these words 
most certainly rattled the colonial authorities – particularly in the light of what happened 
in the following months. Intelligence reports for December 1954 noted that:
“At a beer-drink near Chinsali Boma an African lorry driver reported that seven Mau Mau lead-
ers had been dropped by parachute on the Copperbelt and were teaching the Africans how to run 
a war successfully against the Europeans. He also explained how easy it was to steal arms and 
ammunition from the houses of Europeans – at which point local Congress leaders told him to be 
silent.” (NRPIR December 1954, §84).25 
Although it would turn out to be the case that the claims being made were untrue, 
they did give an indication as to the extent to which the ideals and dreams of “Mau Mau” 
had taken hold of large sections of the population. In the context of beer drink camara-
derie fantastic rumour expressed a desire that fellow drinkers understood and subscribed 
to: the successful defeat of European rule in Northern Rhodesia. However, although there 
were certainly no Mau Mau parachutists on the Copperbelt, the rumours did contain an 
element of truth. Intelligence reports from December 1954 made mention of “two per-
sons, a man and a woman alleged to be Kikuyu, who claim adherence to Mau Mau”. In 
addition these two “are alleged to have said that they have been sent to this Territory to 
instruct Africans in Mau Mau methods” (NRPIR January 1955, §17). In contrast to what 
one might have expected:
“Investigations confirmed the authenticity of the reports and the two persons have been deported 
as undesirable immigrants.” (NRPIR January 1955, §17).
Anxious to contain the situation, which included an ongoing strike on the Copper-
belt and the threat of Mau Mau like violence, the colonial authorities swiftly moved to 
contain the situation. In early January 1955 Harry Nkumbula and Kenneth Kaunda, Presi-
25  The well found recurrent fear of settlers that their servants would steal their fire-arms is an issue that bedevils 
each and every settler society. For a later example see Davis (1987: 137).afrika focus — 2009-06 [ 53 ]
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dent General and Secretary General of the African National Congress, were taken into 
custody and charged with having prohibited publications in their possession. Being in 
possession of what the sentencing magistrate referred to as “cheap, disreputable and 
scandalous literature of a political nature”, Nkumbula and Kaunda were convicted as 
charged and sentenced to two months imprisonment each (Rotberg 1965: 272; NRPIR 
January 1955, §18). Congress offices were raided across the territory leading to the arrest 
of Dominic Mwansa (Provincial President) and David Chitambala (Branch Secretary).   
Being less well known nationally these men, in contrast to Kaunda and Nkumbula, were 
sentenced to jail terms of six, and not two, months for being in possession of prohibited 
literature (Rotberg 1965: 273; NRPIR January 1955, §18).26
Although the arrest of the Congress leaders may have come as a surprise to the Af-
rican population of Northern Rhodesia, it did not, as the authorities may have expected, 
bring to an end the increasingly militant calls for violent action. Instead, far from being 
cowed, Congress supporters argued that “all leaders of national liberatory [sic] move-
ments have, in the past, suffered imprisonment before they achieved their aims” (NRPIR 
January 1955, §19). Some Congress leaders expressed themselves more forcefully. In a 
meeting held in Ndola, following the arrests and raids, Justin Henry Chimba (Western 
Province Provincial Secretary) who would later address another meeting along the same 
lines in Lusaka- and Jovu Hiyanda (Acting Treasurer General) called on followers to 
“support a campaign of murder against Europeans, commencing in the farming areas” 
(NRPIR January 1955, §19). This was particularly disconcerting for the colonial authori-
ties in the context of what was known about Mau Mau:
“All present at the meeting were required to take an oath of secrecy regarding the matters discussed 
and of support for the campaign when instructions were received.”
(NRPIR January 1955, §19, emphasis added).
In addition, in the Northern Province of Northern Rhodesia, Congress made common 
purpose with the Lumpa Church of Alice Lenshina. Congress leaders, Simon Kapwepwe, 
Robert Makasa and John Sokoni, in conjunction with the Lumpa Church encouraged mili-
tant action against the colonial authorities. The orders of chiefs and district commis-
sioners were disobeyed, official cooperatives were boycotted, and in a particularly 
symbolic act “a tree that had been planted to celebrate the coronation of Queen Elizabeth 
II” was torn from the ground (Rotberg 1965: 273). By 1956 the activities of congress sup-
porters, which included highly symbolic activities such as those described above, indi-
cated that little was needed for symbolic action to become armed insurrection. Whilst 
colonial authorities pondered what to do, they will have taken little heart from state-
ments by Congress officials such as Sikalumbe, who had moved up through the ranks 
of Congress to become its Vice-treasurer general, yet continued, true to form, to express 
extremely militant opinions. In the wake of the arrests of Congress officials Sikalumbe 
26  Rotberg refers to David Chitambala as Frank Chitambala. On appeal Chitambala’s sentence was reduced to two 
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warned that, “Congress would go underground if stopped by Europeans”, in addition 
intelligence reports mentioned that “the possibility of introducing Mau Mau is alleged to 
have been discussed at committee meetings”.27
 
  Concluding remarks
This paper has sought to place events in Northern Rhodesia within the wider frame-
work of the end of empire. The development of Mau Mau in Kenya had direct consequences 
for the manner in which politics came to be conducted in Northern Rhodesia. Political 
activists in Northern Rhodesia opposed to white minority rule actively used the example 
of Mau Mau to put pressure upon the colonial administration and its settler population. 
Particularly disconcerting for the colonial administration was the fact that as the 1950s 
progressed and social relations within Northern Rhodesia deteriorated, the rumours of 
war became ever more real. That is, although solid evidence regarding the development 
and training of an armed insurrection along the lines of Mau Mau in Kenya was never 
found in Northern Rhodesia, rumours regarding the development of a ‘homegrown’ 
Mau Mau insurrection in the territory grew ever more adamant and in no small measure 
contributed to political change and the eventual dissolution of the CAF. In effect the 
rumours of Mau Mau, consistently emphasised, as rumours of war, what would happen 
should political change not be realised. That is, in the absence of an objective armed 
insurrection in Northern Rhodesia, the rumour of such an insurrection was sufficient to 
initiate and maintain political change and eventual independence in Zambia.
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